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Abstract:
This study assesses the short-term effects on women's combined work and child care choices of a novel
Norwegian family policy program: the cash-for-care benefit ("kontantstøtte"). Based on cross-sectional
data from two sample surveys carried out just before and just after the reform, multivariate analyses
indicate that there has been a small decline in the work probability of most mothers after the reform,
except among those at the highest educational level. Further there has been a shift from work combined
with subsidised care to work combined with non-subsidised care, as well as a shift from full-time to
part-time work. The impact differs according to educational level. As expected, the choices of mothers
at the upper university level have become more dissimilar to the choices of mothers with low education,
but somewhat surprisingly, the choices of mothers at the middle university level, and especially with
teacher training background, have become more similar to the lowest educational group. Hence, there
are increasing differences in behaviour even among university educated mothers.
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1. Introduction
In August 1998 a novel family policy programme was introduced Norway: the cash-for-care
benefit ("kontantstotte"). All parents of 1-2 year olds who do not use subsidised day-care are
entitled to the benefit, and parents who use part-time care may receive a reduced amount
proportional to the hours of attendance.
The purpose of the reform was threefold: (i) to enablesparents to spend more time with their
children, (ii) to give parents more flexibility in their work and child care choices, and (iii) to
distribute public transfers more equally between users and non-users of subsidised care. Prior to
introduction the reform was fiercely debated, and opponents warned of several possible negative
effects, mainly related to setbacks in gender equality and a shift of child care demand from high
quality professional day-care to more informal arrangements based on private childminders.
Since cash-for-care programs are quite an innovation also internationally, there is little knowledge
so far of its consequences. One exception is a study from Finland by Ilmakunnas (1997) who
analyses the effects of a similar program that was launched in 1985 and fully established in 1990 1 .
She finds that increasing benefit levels increase maternal care and decrease the use of public day-
care, but that private day-care options are less affected by the size of the benefit. Studies of other
aspects of child care demand are more abundant. In an analysis from a similar institutional country
setting, Gustafsson and Stafford (1992) examine the effects of child care subsidies in Sweden.
They find that subsidised child care encourages the market work of mothers of pre-school children,
and when spaces are not rationed, a lower price encourages the use of public day-care. In addition
there are several studies from quite different settings where the role of public policies is generally
weaker and informal modes of child care are more important (see e.g. Blau and Robins 1988,
Hoffert and Wissoker 1992, and Ribar 1992).
A major criticism of the Norwegian reform is that it had not been evaluated properly before
introduction. It came as a result of the 1997 elections, bringing to an end the long-term rule of the
Labour government, and introducing a centre coalition that had pledged to introduce a cash benefit
for child care. Taking the criticism of poor ex-ante evaluation seriously, the government has
commissioned a large-scale appraisal ex-post under the auspices of the Norwegian Research
1
 The Finnish and the Norwegian schemes have many similarities, but there are also several differences. The
main component of both programs is a flat rate basic payment, but the Finnish system also has a means-tested
component and a siblings supplement. Besides many municipalities pay an additional amount that varies
considerably. Unlike the Norwegian system, the Finnish cash-for-care benefit is taxable.
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Council. The present paper reports results from the first stage of one of the projects included in the
evaluation programme, and focuses on short-term effects on women's work and child care choices.
2. The labour market and family policy environment
In a European comparative perspective, the Norwegian family policy programme is quite generous,
and maternal employment is high. In 1997, the labour force participation rate among married and
cohabiting mothers with a youngest child 0-3 years was 75 percent and 83 percent among mothers
of 3-6 year olds (Statistics Norway 1998). This is higher than among women in general and also
higher than among single women (mothers and non-mothers).
No doubt, the availability of long parental leaves and an increasing supply of high quality,
subsidised day-care have made it easier for women to stay in touch with the labour market when
they become mothers (Ronsen and Sundstrom 1999). In Norway, working parents have, since
1993, been entitled to 52 weeks leave with 80 per cent wage compensation or 42 weeks with full
compensation in connection with childbirth 2 . The father may share most of the leave, except three
weeks before birth and six weeks after delivery that are reserved for the mother. In addition,
fathers are entitled to two weeks of unpaid paternity leave immediately after birth. 3
Traditionally, most fathers have taken the two weeks of paternity leave, but very few have used the
opportunity to share parts of the common parental leave period. To encourage the involvement of
both parents in child care, an amendment in 1993 reserved four weeks of the leave extension for
the father - the so called "daddy quota". These weeks are generally not transferable to the mother,
and are lost if the father does not make use of them. Hence there is a strong incentive for fathers to
take the leave, and judged by experience, the reform has been a success. In 1996, three years after
introduction, almost 80 per cent of entitled fathers used the "daddy quota", and furthermore, the
proportion of fathers who shared some of the common parental leave period had risen from four to
12 percent (Brandth and Jensberg 1998).
When the cash-for-care scheme was introduced in August 1988 only one-year olds were eligible
for the benefit, but from January 1999 all children aged 12 to 36 months were included in the
programme. The benefit is a monthly, tax-free flat rate payment of NOK 3.000 (approximately
EUR 360), and is roughly equivalent to the state subsidy for a place in a day-care centre. To be
eligible for the full benefit, the child must not attend a publicly funded day-care centre on a full-
2
 Eligibility requires employment during 6 of the last 10 months prior to birth.
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time basis (more than 32 hours per week). Parents of children that attend part time may receive a
reduced benefit (80, 60, 40 or 20 percent of the full amount), depending on stipulated weekly
attendance. The right of a partial amount for part-time users is regarded as an important device to
fulfil one of the main intentions of the program, to give parents more flexible work and child care
arrangements. Based on a similar reasoning, there is no obligation for parents who claim the
benefit to stay at home and care for the children themselves. They are quite free to buy any other
form of child care, as long as it is not publicly subsidised.
One of the concerns of the opponents of the cash-for-care program was the perceived shift in
family policy from incentives that encouraged the father's involvement in child care to incentives
that were believed to mainly affect mothers (see e.g. Leira 1999 for a discussion). The experience
so far shows that the new scheme is very popular in the sense that a large majority of parents with
children in the eligible age group claims the benefit. In the spring of 1999, about four months after
the scheme was fully established, parents of 75 percent of 1-2 year olds received the benefit
(Reppen and Rønning 1999). In August 1999 the proportion had increased to more than 80 percent.
However, only five percent of the recipients were fathers (Dagsavisen, 26.08.1999).
Another concern of the opponents has been its effect on the child care market, as subsidised day-
care centres have always been in short supply in Norway. But following quick expansions during
the 1980s and the 1990s, the coverage rate reached 50 percent at the end of 1997 (Statistics
Norway 1999)4 . There is still a large geographical variation in coverage, however, and while some
municipalities may be close to full supply, others are still far off s . The coverage rate also increases
with the age of the child, and at the end of 1997 it was 40 percent among 1-2 year olds and 73
percent among 3-5 year olds.
Day-care centres may be owned and run either as public or private enterprises. However, both
forms of ownership receive state subsidies as long as the centre is publicly approved. The
municipality is responsible for approving and supervising private day-care centres, and in many
cases (almost 50 percent) it also supports these enterprises economically (NOU 1996:13). In the
1990s, private day-care centres have accounted for most of the expansion, and today they
3
 Wage compensation is now often granted, following local negotiations.
4
 The coverage rate is defined as the proportion of pre-school children with a subsidised place. If leaving out
children who are usually cared for by parents on parental leave (0-12 month olds), the coverage rate was 60
percent.
5
 Between counties, coverage in 1997 varied from 44 percent to 61 percent, with Oslo, Sogn og Fjordane and
Finnmark having the highest rates. Between municipalities, the difference in coverage is even larger. In 1995-
96 the Ministry of Children and Family Affairs estimated the demand for day-care services to comprise 70
percent of 3-5 year olds and 65 percent of 1-2 year olds (NOU 1996:13).
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constitute about half of all day-care centres in the country (Statistics Norway 1999). Since,
however, private centres are usually smaller than public centres, the proportion of children in
private care is lower, about 40 percent.
The expenses for a publicly approved day-care place are thus shared between the state, the
municipalities and the parents. At the end of the 1980s, the stated intentions were for the state to
pay 40 percent of the cost, while the remaining 60 percent should be divided equally between
parents and municipalities (Stortingsmelding nr. 8, 1987-88). Because of the fast expansion in
private centres, the average municipality share has, however, been lower and the average parental
share higher. In 1994,. 	 for example, parents paid 44,5 percent of the cost in private day-care centres
and 28,8 percent in public centres. The owner, i.e. the municipality or the private enterprise, sets
the parental price. Traditionally, municipality prices have depended on family income, while
private centres charge flat rates. Today, about half the municipalities also charge flat rates. In 1998
average parental payment in large cities and suburbs was about NOK 3 500 (about EUR 420) per
month in private centres and slightly less in public centres (Statistics Norway 1998b). The price
for a toddler may be higher than for older pre-school children, and there is usually a siblings
discount.
One of the consequences of the cash-for-care reform was to substantially raise the relative price of
subsidised care, since parents who buy that kind of care forego a sizeable cash benefit. Hence,
there were fears that parents would switch from professional care to other more informal
arrangements. Consequently, further expansions of the day-care sector could come to a halt, and in
the worst case, some centres might even have to close down. In this scenario parents could end up
having fewer child care choices instead of more, since it may become even harder to get a place in
a day-care centre for those who wish to do so.
So far there is little evidence of a downsizing of the professional day-care sector. While
preliminary figures for 1999 do point to a slight reduction in the number of 1-2 year olds in day-
care centres, this has almost been compensated for by a similar increase in the attendance of 3-5
year olds (Statistics Norway 2000) 6 . The long-term trend of increasing coverage rates in all age
groups has, however, now been broken.
6
 Compared to the December 1997 figures, the preliminary figures for December 1999 show a reduction of
almost 5 000 children or about 4 percent in the age group eligible for cash-for-care benefit, children 1-2 years
old.
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3. A framework for impact assessment
The cash-for-care programme obviously changes the opportunity structure of parents in a
significant manner, by enlarging the budget restriction and changing the relative price of day-care.
To assess the effects on mothers' work and child care choices, my point of departure is a simple,
standard time allocation model in which the father's labour supply is regarded as predetermined
and, hence, exogenous. The mother has preferences over market goods, C, total "child quality" or
"child well-being" for a given number of children, Q, and other home time or leisure, L,
represented by the utility function
(1) U = U(C, Q, L)
The mother's total available time, T, can be divided between hours of market work, H, child care
hours, K, and other home time or leisure:
(2) T=H+K+L
Child quality is produced by inputs of caring time and market and non-market goods. Time for
child care can be supplied by the mother, by other unpaid sources (family members or relatives) or
by services bought in the market. For our purposes and for simplicity we shall only distinguish
between two non-parental caring modes: subsidised day-care and all other, non-subsidised care.
Let X and Z denote hours of subsidised and non-subsidised care, respectively, and let G denote the
goods input. Production of Q is then given by the function
(3) Q = f(G, K, X, Z)
The consumption possibilities is given by the budget constraint
(4) C = Y + wH - (pX + qZ)
where Y is non-labour income, w is the mother's wage rate after taxes and p and q is the price per
hour of subsidised and non-subsidised care, respectively.'
The mother maximises (1) with respect to C, L, and Q given her time constraint (2) and the budget
constraint (4). Labour supply can theoretically range from zero hours to the maximum of the time
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constraint. However, institutional or other regulations normally imply that the choice of working
hours is restricted. The mother's choice is therefore limited to a smaller set of alternatives. For our
purposes we shall assume that her labour supply decision is limited to choosing between full-time
work, part-time work or no market work, and that her demand for hours of non-maternal care is
directly related to her working hours. That is, we only distinguish between different modes of child
care, not between different hours of attendance. We further disregard possible child care use
among non-working mothers, and are left with the following five alternatives:
1. Full-time work / subsidised care (FS)
2. Full-time work / non-subsidised care (FNS)
3. Part-time work / subsidised care (PS)
4. Part-time work / non-subsidised care (PNS)
5. Not working (NW)
The utilities associated with these alternatives are given by
(5)	 U; =v; +egi , j=1,2,..5
where v, is a non-stochastic function of explanatory variables and unknown parameters and e j is an
unobservable random variable. The mother chooses the alternative with the highest utility, i.e.
alternative j is chosen if and only if
(6) U; > Uk,	 for all k#j.
Under certain assumptions 8
 it can be shown (see e.g. Amemiya, 1981) that the probability of
choosing alternative j, Pfi , satisfies
(7) P = eXp(v^ )
exP(vk )
k
P;
 may be a function of both individual-specific and alternative-specific characteristics. In our
case, child care costs and labour income typically differ across alternatives, but so does also
labour-free income since the cash-for-care benefit is directly linked to the use or non-use of
subsidised care. However, due to missing wage and price data I am not able to take alternative
7
 S ince non-subsidised care may be a composite of all other caring modes, q may be regarded as the average
price of other care.
8
 The assumptions are that the e ks have a Type 1 extreme value distribution and are independent across
alternatives.
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specific characteristics into account in the empirical specification. Instead, I estimate a reduced
form of (7) with only individual-specific characteristics, i.e. I estimate the ordinary multinomial
logit model:
(8)
	 p^  — eXp(Xiaj ) 
eXP(XQk )
k
where X is the vector of covariates and (3, is the vector of coefficients. In this model the
coefficients are allowed to differ across alternatives, i.e. individual characteristics may affect each
alternative differently.
To assess the short-term impact of the cash-for-care reform, my first approach is to estimate (8) at
two time points, one just before and one just after the reform was initiated. As the intermediate
time was a period of great stability in the economy, and there were no other significant family
policy reforms, changes in the estimates from one point to the other may be a first sign of policy
impact. Later, I shall also study changes on the individual level in more detail, using the panel part
of the available data (see below).
4. Data and descriptive statistics
The data are from two sample surveys among parents with pre-school children, the first conducted
in April/May 1998 and the second in April/May 1999. The Ministry of Children and Families
Affairs commissioned the surveys to investigate parents' attitudes to the cash-for-care reform, their
expected and actual use of the benefit and changes in relation to the use of child care services,
labour market behaviour and the division of household tasks between the spouses. The 1998
survey was carried out as a postal inquiry among a representative sample of 3500 mothers with
pre-school children aged 0-5 years old. Replies were obtained from 2436 mothers, a response rate
of 70 percent. The 1999 survey was conducted as a telephone interview, comprising all mothers in
the 1998 sample who still had a pre-school child as well as new mothers who had not been
included previously, and who had given birth to a child between the surveys. The final sample
totalled 3872 mothers, of whom 3334 were interviewed - a response rate of 87 percent. The panel
constituted about 60 percent of the net sample. In 1999 fathers of 1-2 year olds were also asked a
few questions. In addition, the mother supplied basic information about the father in each round.
Results from the two surveys have previously been published in Ronning (1998), Reppen and
Ronning (1999), Hellevik (1999) and (2000), and Langset, Lian and Thoresen (2000). Reppen and
Røraning (1999) report that the cash-for-care benefit is claimed for a large majority of eligible
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children (76 percent). Albeit popular in use, when asked what they considered the best initiative to
give families with small children more time together, only about ten percent of mothers as well as
fathers ranked the present cash-for-care scheme the highest. About twice as many ranked a similar
scheme highest, whereby only parents who stay at home and care for their own children would
receive the benefit. However, the initiative that was favoured by the largest group of parents was
an extension of the parental leave period from one to two years. Mothers state that an important
reason for using the benefit is to "spend more time with the children", while most fathers regard an
important reason to be that "the mother wants to stay at home". In families who receive the benefit,
mothers have lower employment activity than other mothers, while fathers' employment activity is
hardly affected at all. About 40 percent of mothers who receive the benefit and who are either
employed or studying, report that they have reduced their work or study activity after the reform,
but about half of them state that they would have done so anyway.
Hellevik (2000) looks closer at changes in behaviour from 1998 to 1999. She reports that the
proportion of mothers of 1-2 year olds who actually worked (i.e. who was employed and not
temporarily on leave) did not change, but that there was a shift from full-time to part-time work.
Surprisingly, the reduction in working hours mainly seems to concern mothers with high education
(university level), while mothers with lower education were less affected. Parental care was more
common in 1999 than in 1998, as non-parental care had been reduced with almost 2.5 hours per
week. There was a slight decrease in the proportion of 1-2 year olds in day-care centres, and a
slight increase in the proportion of 1-year olds looked after by private childminders.
Finally, Langset, Lian and Thoresen (2000) estimate that the cash-for-care reform may have
reduced labour supply among mothers with children in the eligible ages with approximately 3500-
4500 man-years (or rather woman-years). The largest reduction appears to be in the public sector,
and especially in the health- and educational sector.
This study is a multivariate analysis of mothers' joint employment and child care choices, focusing
on the determinants of their decisions. The analysis is limited to mothers with children in the
eligible age, i.e. to those who had at least one child aged 12-35 months at the time of response.
Due to a few observations with missing or incomplete data, the total analysis sample consists of
1214 mothers in 1998 and 1690 mothers in 1999. The samples include single as well as cohabiting
and married mothers. When partners' characteristics are included in the analysis, the estimates are
based on sub-samples of married and cohabiting mothers with non-missing information on their
partner. These sub-samples constitute about 85 percent of the total analysis samples, and consist of
1025 and 1441 mothers in 1998 and 1999, respectively.
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In addition to models with five response levels, distinguishing between full-time and part-time
work, I also report results from models where full-time and part-time have been collapsed. Work is
defined as being employed and at work, i.e. women with paid or unpaid leave are regarded as not
working. If a mother has more than one child, her child care choice is related to the child that is
eligible for the cash-for-care benefit. If she has more than one child in this age group (applies to
about 4 percent), the choice is related to the youngest of them.
Descriptive statistics for the two different aggregation levels of the dependent variable are given in
Table 1 a. In addition to the results already reported in Hellevik (2000) of stable employment
proportions, but less full-time work, we also note that there has been a shift from subsidised care to
non-subsidised care. The lower proportion of full-time work in 1999 can fully be accounted for by
a lower proportion who combine full-time and subsidised care, while the higher proportion of part-
time work can primarily be ascribed to a higher proportion who combines part-time and non-
subsidised care.
Descriptive statistics of the model covariates are given in Table lb. These include human capital
variables, demographic variables and a set of regional dummies, and for the subgroup of married
and cohabiting mothers also partner's characteristics, including his income and total household
debt (mortgage and other loans). Unfortunately, there is no survey information on the mother's
wage9 - the shadow-price of not working. When child care costs are concerned, there is detailed
price information in the 1999 data, but in 1998 it is not possible to distinguish the price of different
types of child care, as total child care costs were reported as one single sum lo .
5. Covariates and hypotheses
Since the mother's wage is not included in the model, her age and educational level will also reflect
behavioural differences related to differences in earnings potential. As wage is normally positively
correlated with age and education, the estimated indirect effects of these proxies on employment
are expected to be positive. As older and more highly educated women may also be more attached
to the labour market, the direct effects of age and education pull in the same direction, leading to a
clear hypothesis of positive effects on employment of these variables.
9
 There is information on the mother's annual income the previous year, but no record of her employment
activity that year. Using normal working hours at the time of response to estimate the wage rate would no
doubt introduce large measurement errors and render subsequent wage predictions rather futile.
10 Even if available, there is the additional difficulty of income-dependent day-care prices. As mothers'
earnings are included in the income basis, the actual price paid is really endogenous in the model.
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In the debate preceding the introduction of the cash-for-care reform, an argument often
encountered was that it would mainly be mothers with low education that would use the benefit to
stay home and look after their children, and hence reduce their labour supply. If this were the case,
we should expect larger educational differences in employment activity in 1999 than in 1998.
When child care is concerned, previous evidence indicates that highly educated mothers are more
likely than others mothers to use day-care centres (see e.g. Ilmakunnas 1997, Hellevik 1999). This
difference seems to increase with increasing coverage level, which is probably a result of higher
unmet demand for day-care among the well-educated in a situation with stricter rationing.
The information on mother's age and mother's educational level is extracted directly from
administrative registers and linked to the survey data. The average age in the sample over the two
years was about 31 years. Educational level is classified according to the stipulated time needed to
obtain a certain level. The largest educational group, comprising about 40 percent of the mothers,
has an upper secondary education (11-12 years total schooling), but almost as many (about 35
percent) have some university education (more than 12 years). About 20 percent have a degree that
requires 3-4 years of university study (15-16 years in all), while about 5 percent have a post-
graduate degree that normally takes 5-6 years at university (at least 17 years in all).
A well-established finding from numerous studies in many countries is that female labour supply
decreases with the number of children and increases with the age of the youngest child. From
official statistics (e.g. Statistics Norway 1997) we also know that the use of day-care centres
increases with the age of the child. Even if this could partly be a result of shorter supply and more
rationing among the youngest, several surveys also indicate that the demand for day-care increases
with the age of the child (Schytte Blix 1993, Røraning 1998). We therefore expect a positive effect
of the child's age on employment in general, that is likely to be stronger for the work subsidised
care option than for the work/non-subsidised care option.
In our sample all mothers have at least one child aged 1-2, but some may also have younger
children (and/or of course older). After some experimenting, I decided to model the age-of-child
effect by two variables: (i) age of youngest eligible child measured in months (i.e. 12-35 months)
and (ii) a dummy for younger siblings (i.e. 0-11 months). In 1998 the average age of the youngest
eligible child was 21,9 months (23,8 months in 1998), and about 10 percent of the mothers also
had a younger child. More than half the mothers had only one child, about 40 percent had two
children and about five percent had three or more children below school age.
12
Marital status is primarily an indicator of different economic opportunities as single mothers
cannot draw on the income of a partner. However, in Norway single mothers with pre-school
children may receive a relatively generous transitional allowance ("overgangsstønad") for a
maximum of three years if they are not able to support themselves. The allowance is income
dependent, as earnings over a certain (low) amount is deducted by 40 percent. On top of the
ordinary marginal tax this results in very high gross marginal rates (up to 70 percent, see e.g.
Rønsen and Strøm 1993). As a result, part-time work has not been as common among single
mothers as among mothers in general, and single mothers also have a lower total employment rate
(Kjeldstad and Rønsen, forthcoming) 11 . On the other hand, single mothers often get priority to
rationed day-care places and pay a reduced rate. They may therefore in particular be less likely to
combine work and non-subsidised care compared to other mothers. I further distinguish between
married and cohabiting mothers, as previous research indicates that cohabiting mothers have a
stronger labour market attachment than married mothers (see e.g. Rønsen 1993). Allthough
cohabitation is widespread in Norway, marriage is still the most common way of living together
for the mothers in our sample. More than 60 percent are married, about 30 percent are cohabiting
and the remaining 5-8 percent are single mothers.
Regional dummies are the final covariates common to all models. Apart from cultural differences,
region also picks up differences in employment patterns and day-care coverage. The South-West is
the largest of the four regions, comprising about one third of the mothers, while the rest constitute
three regions of about similar size. The South-West is usually regarded the area with the most
traditional family values. It also has the lowest average day-care coverage. The highest coverage
level is found in the metropolitan area (Oslo/Akershus) and in the North, which are both areas with
less traditional family values. We therefore expect mothers to be more likely to work and to use
subsidised care in these regions.
When estimating the model on the sub-group of married and cohabiting women I also include
partner's characteristics. Constituting a large component of the mother's budget restriction,
partner's income is an important variable. Like other labour free income it is assumed to increase
consumption of normal goods, including home time and child care, and hence to reduce labour
supply. The negative effect may be stronger for work combined with non-subsidised care, as
families with higher income can better afford to pay the relatively high price of professional day-
11 In 1998 the employment rates among single and non-single mothers with children 0-15 years were 65 and
81 percent, respectively. The corresponding full-time rates (proportion of working mothers who work >_ 36
hours per week) were 47 and 41 percent. Working hours refer to hours actually worked. The difference
between the two groups has become smaller during the 1990s, as the full-time rate among single mothers has
decreased while it has increased among married and cohabiting mothers.
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care. This is especially relevant after the cash-for-care reform that almost doubled the price of
subsidised care in real terms. Partner's income refers to his annual pre-tax labour income previous
year, and averaged about 280 000 NOK (about 33 600 EUR) for 1998 and 1999 samples. Also
important in the budget restriction is the family's household debt, which reduces consumption
possibilities and therefore has the opposite effect of partner's income. The average total household
debt at the time of response was about 640 000 NOK (about 76 800 EUR).
After controlling for partner's income, the effect of his education is probably weaker. However, I
also include partner's education, as it may reflect differential attitudes among fathers toward
mothers' employment and child care that would not be captured otherwise. Partner's education is
based on survey information supplied by the mother and is reported in four response categories:
primary school, secondary school, 1-3 years of university studies, and 4 years or more of university
studies. In the analysis the two upper levels have been collapsed as their estimates were quite
similar. About 40 percent of the partners had some university education, almost as many as the
group with secondary education 12 , while 12-13 percent had primary school only.
Finally, I include two indicators related to the fathers work situation: (i) partner's working hour
arrangement (normal daytime work or other work arrangements) and (ii) partner's job sector
(health or school sector versus other sectors). Since these variables are only relevant if the partner
works, they are introduced in interactions with a dummy variable for father's work status
(employed/not employed). The large majority of fathers were employed (97-98 percent), about two
thirds worked normal daytime hours, and about ten percent worked in the health- or school-
sector13 .
If fathers work non-standard hours, they may be more able to look after their children during the
day, making it easier for mothers to work without using a day-care place. If the father works in the
health- or school sector it may be easier for the family to get a day-care place, since these sectors
often have their own day-care centres. In addition these fathers may be more family- and child-
oriented and take more part in the household work, making it easier for the mother to be employed.
Hence, mothers with a partner in the health and school sector may be more likely to work and use
subsidised care.
12
 In the 1988 postal survey there were more incomplete data, and information on partner's education was
missing for 3 percent of the informants. Rather than leaving out these observations, I decided to treat them as
a separate group in the analysis.
13
 Social work and work in the day-care sector are also included in the health- and school sector.
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6. Results
Table 2 reports estimates from a multinomial logit model with three response levels: (i)
work subsidised care, (ii) work/non-subsidised care and (iii) no work. In Table 3 I also distinguish
between full-time and part-time work, and get five response levels: (i) full-time/subsidised care,
(ii) full-time/non-subsidised care, (iii) part-time/subsidised care, (iv) part-time/non-subsidised care
and (v) no work. We shall discuss these results in conjunction, taking the simplest model as our
point of departure, and supplementing with results from the more detailed model if that gives
additional insight. The effect of covariates that are common to all mothers will be commented
based on the full sample, but the results do not differ much when based on the sub-sample of
married and cohabiting mothers. As the primary purpose is to assess whether the behaviour of
mothers have changed after the introduction of the cash-for-care program, special attention is given
to possible changes in the estimates from 1998 to 1999.
Starting with the estimates for 1998, we notice that most coefficients have the expected sign and
are on the whole significant. Age appears to have no effect on work that is combined with non-
subsidised care, but this is mainly due to no effect on the part-time/non-subsidised care alternative
(table 3). The educational effects are stronger for work combined with subsidised care than for
work combined with non-subsidised care, and are stronger for full-time work than for part-time
work. In fact, in 1998 there are no differences between the educational groups in the choice of
part-time/non-subsidised care.
Having controlling for the presence of a sibling 0-12 months, which strongly inhibits employment,
there are no further negative effects of the number of children in 1998 14 . As expected, the work
probability increases with the age of the eligible child, but mainly when it is combined with
subsidised care. Also as expected, married and cohabiting mothers are more likely to have paid
work than single mothers, but significantly so only if it is combined with non-subsidised care.
Table 3 further shows that this mainly concerns part-time work. Finally, the regional pattern
corresponds well with a priory reasoning: mothers in the East and South-West are less likely to
work and use subsidised care than mothers in the capital area of Oslo/Akershus, particularly if they
are working full-time. Mothers in the North are also less inclined to work full-time and use
subsidised care, but on the other hand they are more likely to choose part-time and non-subsidised
care.
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Turning to the sub-group of married and cohabiting mothers, the latter seem to be more inclined to
work and use subsidised care than the former, but this mainly concerns the part-time/subsidised
care alternative. Characteristics of the partner seem to play a fairly modest role, and in 1998 only
work in the health or school sector is significant. It has a clear positive effect on mother's
employment in general, but is strongest for work, and in particular part-time work, in combination
with subsidised care. There is also some indication that the mother is more inclined to work and
use subsidised care if the father works regular daytime hours than if he has another work schedule.
This renders little support for the hypothesis that it may be easier for mothers to be employed if the
partner works non-standard hours. However, since regular evening or night shifts only constitute a
small part of "other arrangements", we cannot draw any firm conclusion on this basis 15 . Finally,
there is clear evidence that higher household debt prompts mothers to work. The effect is most
pronounced for full-time work and particularly full-time combined with subsidised care.
Now let us look for impacts of the cash-for-care reform, expressed as changes in the estimates
from 1998 to 1999. Before proceeding, we should be reminded that given our sample size, standard
errors and confidence intervals will necessarily be relatively large, requiring a substantial change
from one year to the other for the difference to be significant in statistical terms. At this
exploratory stage of analysis we shall, however, be somewhat less restrictive, and shall also
comment on patterns and trends in the material that seem noteworthy, even if they may not be
significant in the strict sense.
At first glance (table 2) the effect of mother's age seems quite stable, but turning to table 3, we see
that the positive effect on the full-time/non-subsidised care option have vanished. However, more
evident, and more intriguing, are the changes in the effects of education, where there is a shift in
opposite direction for the various university groups. While the work behaviour of mothers with a
medium level university degree (3-4 years of university study) in 1999 has become more similar to
mothers with low education, the difference between the reference group and mothers with a lower
and especially with a higher university degree has become larger. Hence, the behavioural
difference between the two upper university educated groups has also increased.
Relative to the reference group, mothers at the highest university level have an increased
propensity in 1999 to work regardless of child care choice, while mothers with a short university
14
 In models distinguishing between full-time and part-time we could not include a dummy for younger
siblings because of empty cells in the dependent variable. I.e. some of these alternatives were not chosen by
any of the mothers with a child less than one year old.
15
 Other work arrangements also include various shift work, and work that either starts before 6 a.m. or
finishes after 6 p.m. Hence, it may also include jobs with very long working hours.
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education only have an increased propensity to work and use subsidised care. This is mainly due to
a higher likelihood of working part time (table 3). In 1998 there was no difference between the
reference group and the highest educated mothers in the choice of part-time options, but in 1999
part-time work had become relatively much more common among the latter, especially when
combined with subsidised care.
Since typical female professions such as nursing and teaching usually require 3-4 years of
university study, I expected field of study to throw additional light on the changing behaviour of
this particular group. Hence, I re-estimated the model, splitting the middle university group into
three fields of study: (i) teacher training programs, (ii) medical programs and (iii) other programs.
The results show, somewhat surprisingly, that teachers in particular have changed their behaviour
in the direction of the reference group. This is expressed as a smaller difference in work activity in
general, and especially in work that is combined with subsidised care (table 4). Almost all of the
reduced dissimilarity can be ascribed to the full-time/subsidised care option (table 5). Other fields
of study display smaller changes relative to the reference group. Mothers within the medical field
(mainly nurses) only have an increased propensity to work part-time and use subsidised care, while
mothers within other fields have become more inclined to work part time in general, but less
inclined to work full-time and use non-subsidised care.
The changes in the effects of the children variables are more difficult to assess as these covariates
are highly correlated. In table 2 the number of children seem to have a slightly stronger inhibiting
effect on employment in 1999 than in 1998, while the effect of a younger sibling is less negative,
which is somewhat confusing. The effect of the age of youngest eligible child appears quite stable
in table 2, but changes more when looking at full-time and part-time separately (table 3). This may
also be a result of having to leave out the dummy for youngest sibling in the latter model (see
footnote 14). As to marital status, the changes in the estimates are more clear-cut. Relative to
single mothers, married and cohabiting mothers seem to have become more inclined to work and
use subsidised care and less inclined to work and use non-subsidised care in 1999 than in 1998. In
particular they are less inclined to work part time and use non-subsidised care. Rather than
indicating a reduced probability among married and cohabiting mothers of choosing the latter
option, this may indicate that single mothers may find part-time work combined with non-
subsidised care more attractive after the introduction of the cash-for-care reform.
Turning to the partner's characteristics, the income effect is negative for 1999, but is only
significant for work that is combined with non-subsidised care. This is in line with our a priory
reasoning that non-labour income may especially inhibit work that is combined with non-
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subsidised care, as high-income families can better afford to pay the price of professional care,
especially after the cash-for-care reform when the price almost doubled in real terms. Other
indications of larger income effects in 1999 are the more pronounced negative impact of partner's
education and the stronger positive effect of household debt. As evident from table 3, the strongest
effect of partner's income and household debt is related to full-time work, while the strongest
effect of partner's education is mainly on part-time work. The estimates further show that the
positive effect in 1998 of having a partner who works in the health and school sector has almost
vanished in 1999, except for the part-time/subsidised care option.
Finally, the regional differences appear to be smaller in 1999. The lower propensity of mothers in
the East and the South-West to work and use subsidised care compared to mothers in the capital
region (Oslo/Akershus) has vanished or become smaller, as has the higher propensity of mothers in
the North to work and use non-subsidised care. However, turning to table 3, mothers in the East
and South-West still appear to be less inclined to choose full-time/subsidised care, albeit to a to a
lesser extent than in 1998. Further, mothers in the North are no longer less inclined to choose full-
time/subsidised care, and have become more inclined to choose part-time/subsidised care relative
to mothers in the capital region.
The changes discussed so far are relative changes, that is changes in the difference between
groups. To assess absolute changes, i.e. changes within a single group, I have also computed the
choice probabilities as formulated in equation (8) for different educational groups, using the
estimated coefficients in table 5, and taking a mother with about average characteristics as
reference person 16 . The probabilities are reported in table 6. We note, first, that all groups except
those at the highest educational level have a higher probability of not working in 1999 than in
1998. The reduced propensity to work is particularly prominent among university educated
mothers with teacher training background among whom the probability of not working has doubled
(from 14 to 29 percent). Another group with a relatively large increase in the probability of not
working is mothers with an upper secondary education (EDUS2).
Next, we observe a substantial decline in the choice probabilities involving subsidised care. All
educational groups are less likely to choose the full-time/subsidised care option in 1999, and
mothers with less than 3-4 years of university studies or teacher training at that level are also less
likely to choose part-time/subsidised care. Conversely, there is an increase in the choice
probabilities involving non-subsidised care. All educational groups have a higher probability of
16
 The mother is assumed to be 30 years old, married, have one child of 24 months and live in the
Oslo/Akerhus region.
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choosing part-time/non-subsidised care in 1999, and all but those at the lowest university level are
more likely to chose full-time/non-subsidised care.
There has thus been a marked shift from subsidised to non-subsidised care. For full-time, however,
the higher probability of working and using non-subsidised care far from compensates for the
lower probability of using subsidised care, while for part-time increased activity related to non-
subsidised care more than replaces the lower activity linked to subsidised care, except in the
lowest educational group. Hence, there has also been a shift from full-time to part-time work, but
except for the highest educational group, increased part-time does not fully compensate for
reduced full-time work, resulting in a higher probability of not working in 1999. In particular, part-
time has only replaced full-time to a small extent in the upper secondary and in the mid-university
teacher training group.
7. Summary and conlusion
This study is part of a larger project commissioned by the Norwegian government to evaluate the
recent cash-for-care reform ("kontantstøtte"). The reform grants a tax-free, flat rate benefit to all
parents of children aged one and two who do not use subsidised day-care. The full benefit equals
the subsidy of a full-time place, and parents who use part-time day-care may receive a reduced
benefit proportional to the hours of attendance.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the short-term effects of the reform on mother's work and
child care choices. As decisions in these areas are likely to be taken jointly, I estimate a
simultaneous multinomial logit model that incorporates the choice of full-time, part-time or non-
employment in conjunction with subsidised or non-subsidised day-care. My focus is on the
determinants of mothers' work and child care choices, and especially on possible changes from
1998 to 1999 that may be ascribed to the cash-for-care reform.
The data are from two sample surveys among parents of pre-school children carried out in the
spring of 1998 and 1999 especially designed to investigate the impacts of the cash-for-care reform.
Descriptive analyses already published show that the reform is very popular in the sense that it is
claimed for three out of four children in the eligible age (Reppen and Rønning 1999). However,
other policies like extended parental leave were more favoured when parents were asked what they
considered the best initiative to give families more time together. Hellevik (2000) further reports
that mothers' labour force participation is little affected, but that there has been a shift from full-
time to part-time work, especially among highly educated mothers. Analysed by sector, the largest
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reductions in (wo)man hours have been in the public sector, and especially in the health and
educational sector (Langset, Lian and Thoresen 2000).
The multivariate analyses presented here indicate that all things being equal, there has been a small
decline in the work probability of most mothers after the cash-for-care reform, except among those
with education at the highest university level. Further there has been a shift from work combined
with subsidised care to work combined with non-subsidised care, as well as a shift from full-time
to part-time work. An interesting finding is the different impact displayed within the group of
university educated mothers. The only mothers in this group who have changed behaviour in the
direction of mothers with low education are those at the medium level (3-4 years of university
studies). The behaviour of mothers with a lower and especially with a higher university degree has,
on the other hand, become more dissimilar from mothers with low education. But while mothers
with a lower university degree only have an increased propensity to work and use subsidised care
relative to the reference group, mothers at the highest university level also have an increased
propensity to work and use non-subsidised care.
When further dividing the group with medium level university education by field of study, it
becomes clear that particularly mothers with a teacher training background have changed their
behaviour in the direction of mothers in the reference group. Although not completely unexpected,
a common a priory assumption was rather that especially the nursing profession would be affected.
This assumption only partly holds, as nurses to a larger extent have shifted from full-time to part-
time work after the reform, while teachers have been more likely to take leave or exit the labour
force altogether.
Concluding for the short run, the cash-for-care reform has no doubt reduced female labour supply
and discouraged the use of subsidised care. As expected, some mothers have been affected more
than others, and both level and field of education seem to constitute important dividing lines in this
connection. It is also worth remembering that our findings are based on data that were collected
only a few moths after the full implementation of the program. Since all adaptation takes time, the
results reported here may underestimate the total short-run effects. An important task will therefore
be to monitor future developments, and if the short-term pattern should prevail, there may be good
reason for concern about setbacks in gender equality and increasing social inequality among
women.
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Table la. Descriptive statistics -dependent variable
Variable Label
All mothers Married and cohabiting
mothers1
1998 1999 1998 1999
N % N % N % N %
I. Work/child care: 1214 100,0 1690 100,0 1025 100,0 1441 100,0
Work / Subsidised care WS 347 28,6 . 445 26,3 311 30,3 398 27,6
Work / Non-subsidised care WNS 410 33,8 611 36,2 350 34,1 539 37,4
Not working	 ('Refgroup,) NW 457 37,6 634 37,5 364 35,5 504 35,0
II. Working hours/child care: 1214 100,0 1690 100,0 1025 100,0 1441 100,0
Full-time / Subsidised care FS 213 _ 17,5 243 14,4 191 18,6 220 15,3
Full-time / Non-subsidised care FNS 161 13,3 225 13,3 138 13,5 198 13,7
Part-time / Subsidised care PS 134 11,0 202 12,0 120 11,7 178 12,4
Part-time / Non-subsidised care PNS 249 20,5 386 22,8 212 20,7 341 23,7
Not working	 (Refgroup) NW 457 37,6 634 37,5 364 35,5 504 35,0
1 Sub-sample with non-missing information on partner's characteristics.
23
Table lb. Descriptive statistics -independent variables
Variable Label
All mothers Married and cohabiting
mothers'
1998 1999 1998 1999
Mother's age (years) AGE 30,4 31,6 30 7 31,9
Mother's education:
7-10 years2
	(Refgroup) 23,2 23,6 19 , 1 20,8
11-12 years EDUS2 40,0 40,7 40,6 40,1
13-14 years EDUU1 10,7 10,4 11,0 11,3
15-16 years EDUU2 21,2 20,9 23,9 22,8
17 years or more EDUU3 5,4 4,5 5, 8 5,1
No. of pre-school children:
One	 (Refgroup) 52,8 54,6 51 , 8 52,7
Two NOCH2 42,3 40,1 43 , 2 41,8
Three or more NOCH3 4,8 5,3 5,0 5,5
Age y. eligible child (months) AGEYEC 21,9 23,8 21 , 9 23,8
Siblings 0-11 months:
Yes SIBLO 9,8 8,6 10 , 4 9,1
No	 (Ref group) 90,2 91,4 89 , 6 90,9
Marital status:
Single
	 (Refgroup) 5,4 7,9 - -
Cohabiting COHAB 30,0 30,7 31 , 0 32,3
Married MARR 64,7 61,4 69 , 0 67,7
Partner's education:
Primary school (Ref group) 12 , 3 12,7
Secondary school PEDUS 42 , 5 47,3
University PEDUU 42 , 1 40,0
Missing PEDUMISS 3 , 0
Partner's work status:
Not employed
	 (Refgroup) 1 , 8 3,1 .
Employed PEMPL 98 , 2 96,9
Partner's work arrangement:
Normal daytime PDAY 66 , 0 68,7
Other hours
	 (Refgroup) 34 , 0 31,3
Partner's job sector:
Health / school PHSSEC 10 , 1 10,4
Other sector	 (Ref group) 89 , 9 89,6
Partner's income (10 000 kr.) PINC 27,03 28,70
Household debt (10 000 kr.) DEBT 64,44 64,37
Region:
Oslo/Akershus
	 (Refgroup) 20,1 21 , 1 19,8 21,3
Rest of the East EAST 23,7 23 , 8 22,6 24,9
South-West SWEST 35,4 33 , 0 36,7 32,8
North NORTH 20,8 22 , 1 20,9 21,0
Sub-sample with non-missing information on partner's characteristics. ` Incl. missing.
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Table 2. The choice of work and child care. Simultaneous multinomial logit model.
Variable
All mothers Married and cohabiting mothers 1
1998 1999 1998 1999
WS WNS WS WNS WS WNS WS WNS
INTERCEPT -4,615 (0,696) -2,738 (0,661) -5,623 (0,624) -1,317 (0,508) -3,803 (1,001) -0,907 (0,882) -6,318 (0,959) 0,072 (0,697)
AGE 0,047 (0,018) 0,022 (0,016) 0,045 (0,015) -0,004 (0,013) 0,032 (0,021) 0,013 (0,019) 0,043 (0,018) 0,004 (0,015)
EDUS2 0,962 (0,222) 0,442 (0,184) 0,788 (0,193) 0,308 (0,152) 0,845 (0,258) 0,411 (0,216) 0,851 (0,225) 0,348 (0,175)
EDUU1 1,084 (0,298) 0,304 (0,277) 1,320 (0,261) 0,376 (0,237) 1,020 (0,341) 0,317 (0,312) 1,152 (0,294) 0,417 (0,261)
EDUU2 2,097 (0,272) 1,083 (0,245) 1,709 (0,224) 0,724 (0,192) 1,862 (0,307) 1,019 (0,275) 1,507 (0,258) 0,684 (0,221)
EDUU3 2,450 (0,472) 1,414 (0,455) 3,566 (0,534) 2,445 (0,516) 2,091 (0,518) 1,277 (0,495) 3,551 (0,587) 2,766 (0,564)
NOCH2 -0,043 (0,173) -0,173 (0,160) -0,218 (0,152) -0,254 (0,134) -0,111 (0,191) -0,193 (0,177) -0,225 (0,165) -0,221 (0,147)
NOCH3 -0,837 (0,541) -0,343 (0,399) -1,039 (0,431) -0,902 (0,311) -1,491 (0,638) -0,666 (0,444) -0,929 (0,445) -0,775 (0,328)
SIBLO -5,945 (1,036) -3,713 (0,502) -4,537 (0,640) -3,441 (0,451) -5,968 (1,047) -3,513 (0,516) -4,673 (0,655) -3,527 (0,463)
AGEYEC 0,110 (0,014) 0,017 (0,013) 0,111 (0,011) 0,011 (0,010) 0,115 (0,016) 0,010 (0,015) 0,110 (0,013) 0,006 (0,011)
COHAB 0,578 (0,355) 1,577 (0,403) 1,063 (0,277) 1,339 (0,249) 0,347 (0,207) 0,072 (0,189) 0,483 (0,177) 0,248 (0,154)
MARR 0,265 (0,342) 1,397 (0,396) 0,583 (0,266) 0,968 (0,242)
PEDUS 0,274 (0,292) 0,427 (0,263) 0,266 (0,266) -0,019 (0,207)
PEDUH -0,409 (0,312) -0,162 (0,284) 0,117 (0,288) -0,489 (0,236)
PEDUMISS -0,772 (0,577) -0,083 (0,479)
PEMPL -0,731 (0,709) -0,234 (0,632) 0,871 (0,644) 0,198 (0,394)
PEMPL*PDAY 0,389 (0,203) 0,011 (0,179) 0,320 (0,181) -0,033 (0,153)
PEMPL*PHSSEC 1,115 (0,353) 0,763 (0,336) 0,469 (0,263) 0,173 (0,258)
PINC 0,003 (0,007) 0,004 (0,007) -0,010 (0,006) -0,025 (0,006)
DEBT 0,006 (0,002) 0,002 (0,002) 0,007 (0,002) 0,006 (0,002)
EAST -0,665 (0,249) 0,268 (0,238) -0,158 (0,212) 0,311 (0,190) -0,667 (0,283) 0,096 (0,270) -0,103 (0,235) 0,159 (0,210)
SWEST -0,893 (0,228) -0,072 (0,221) -0,400 (0,198) 0,086 (0,178) -0,775 (0,255) -0,142 (0,248) -0,428 (0,222) -0,110 (0,198)
NORTH -0,426 (0,268) 0,597 (0,248) 0,155 (0,214) 0,298 (0,197) -0,464 (0,302) 0,417 (0,279) 0,121 (0,243) 0,002 (0,224)
Likelihood ratio 2144,05 3023,06 1868,99 2608,76
DF 2314 3244 2006 2840
N 1214 1690 1025 1441
1 Sub-sample with non-missing information on partner's characteristics. Numbers in bold: Significant at the 5 % level. Numbers in italics: Significant
at 10% level. (Standard errors in parentheses).
Table 3. The choice of working hours and child care. Simultaneous multinomial logn model. All mothers.
Variabel
1998 1999
FS FNS PS PNS FS FNS PS PNS
INTERCEPT -3,277 (0,754) -2,829 (0,856) -6,148 (0,916) -2,749 (0,796) -4,704 (0,708) -1,591 (0,675) -7,797 (0,813) -1,926 (0,569)
AGE 0,051 (0,020) 0,053 (0,021) 0,091 (0,022) 0,032 (0,018) 0,053 (0,017) 0,017 (0,017) 0,099 (0,018) 0,021 (0,014)
EDUS2 0,949 (0,266) 0,631 (0,267) 0,673 (0,284) 0,192 (0,199) 0,621 (0,231) 0,207 (0,210) 0,814 (0,252) 0,262 (0,165)
EDUU1 0,988 (0,345) 0,841 (0,352) 0,930 (0,359) -0,263 (0,331) 1,107 (0,298) 0,353 (0,315) 1,304 (0,319) 0,214 (0,257)
EDUU2 1,902 (0,290) 1,002 (0,310) 1,063 (0,324) 0,458 (0,246) 1,521 (0,253) 0,733 (0,249) 1,480 (0,276) 0,469 (0,206)
EDUU3 1,970 (0,414) 1,759 (0,429) 0,797 (0,542) -0,661 (0,587) 2,988 (0,469) 2,564 (0,465) 2,590 (0,515) 1,041 (0,500)
NOCH2 -0,723 (0,185) -1,184 (0,212) -0,569 (0,211) -0,338 (0,169) -0,807 (0,171) -0,999 (0,177) -0,682 (0,180) -0,537 (0,141)
NOCH3 -2,648 (0,635) -1,947 (0,549) -2,002 (0,632) -1,150 (0,395) -2,277 (0,504) -2,446 (0,543) -2,411 (0,623) -1,352 (0,310)
AGEYEC 0,041 (0,014) -0,037 (0,016) 0,070 (0,016) -0,031 (0,013) 0,062 (0,012) -0,029 (0,012) 0,086 (0,014) -0,020 (0,010)
COHAB 0,284 (0,394) 1,035 (0,518) 0,612 (0,495) 1,756 (0,550) 0,681 (0,322) 1,095 (0,339) 0,935 (0,363) 1,177 (0,294)
MARR 0,083 (0,382) 0,926 (0,510) 0,304 (0,479) 1,618 (0,544) 0,397 (0,312) 0,686 (0,337) 0,453 (0,353) 0,971 (0,289)
EAST -1,044 (0,268) -0,190 (0,304) 0,011 (0,311) 0,585 (0,269) -0,492 (0,240) 0,186 (0,243) 0,447 (0,262) 0,538 (0,209)
SWEST -1,014 (0,237) -0,229 (0,275) -0,311 (0,295) 0,200 (0,257) -0,662 (0,219) -0,152 (0,231) 0,081 (0,251) 0,292 (0,196)
NORTH -0,747 (0,273) 0,394 (0,294) -0,248 (0,346) 0,549 (0,280) 0,061 (0,230) 0,270 (0,250) 0,554 (0,271) 0,475 (0,218)
Likelihood ratio 3264,23 4569,31
DF 4616 6480
N 1214 1690
Numbers in bold: Significant at 5%-level. Numbers in italics: significant at 10%-level. (Standard errors in parantheses).
Table 3 (contin.) The choice of working hours and child care. Simultaneous multinomial logit model. Married and
cohabiting mothers e
Variabel
1998 1999
FS FNS PS PNS FS FNS PS PNS
INTERCEPT -2,149 (1,055) -1,535 (1,204) -6,007 (1,433) -0,627 (0,964) -5,700 (1,139) -0,498 (0,877) -8,103 (1,186) -0,500 (0,754)
AGE 0,035 (0,023) 0,045 (0,025) 0,087 (0,025) 0,029 (0,021) 0,044 (0,020) 0,034 (0,020) 0,105 (0,021) 0,023 (0,016)
EDUS2 0,740 (0,302) 0,660 (0,318) 0,665 (0,325) 0,145 (0,233) 0,583 (0,265) 0,228 (0,239) 1,095 (0,295) 0,346 (0,187)
EDUU1 0,963 (0,387) 1,000 (0,406) 0,839 (0,416) -0,299 (0,369) 0,945 (0,332) 0,416 (0,341) 1,238 (0,367) 0,263 (0,281)
EDUU2 1,705 (0,330) 1,107 (0,362) 0,916 (0,371) 0,433 (0,281) 1,267 (0,291) 0,644 (0,287) 1,470 (0,326) 0,510 (0,235)
EDUU3 1,617 (0,474) 1,682 (0,511) 0,679 (0,595) -0,538 (0,619) 2,827 (0,515) 2,664 (0,514) 2,614 (0,577) 1,392 (0,536)
NOCH2 -0,829 (0,202) -1,259 (0,233) -0,746 (0,230) -0,374 (0,187) -0,827 (0,182) -0,911 (0,188) -0,796 (0,194) -0,615 (0,152)
NOCH3 -3,238 (0,767) -2,662 (0,750) -2,637 (0,762) -1,234 (0,423) -2,149 (0,519) -2,308 (0,550) -2,291 (0,628) -1,289 (0,320)
AGEYEC 0,038 (0,016) -0,049 (0,018) 0,070 (0,018) -0,041 (0,015) 0,058 (0,013) -0,038 (0,013) 0,072 (0,015) -0,032 (0,011)
COHAB 0,183 (0,220) 0,033 (0,241) 0,398 (0,246) -0,018 (0,202) 0,309 (0,198) 0,329 (0,196) 0,486 (0,208) 0,078 (0,163)
PEDUS 0,510 (0,329) 0,690 (0,363) 0,207 (0,356) 0,385 (0,281) 0,656 (0,351) 0,195 (0,283) -0,244 (0,304) -0,214 (0,213)
PEDUH -0,444 (0,352) -0,288 (0,394) -0,408 (0,377) -0,106 (0,305) 0,426 (0,371) -0,355 (0,323) -0,295 (0,325) -0,648 (0,246)
PEDUMISS -0,416 (0,735) 0,579 (0,653) -0,199 (0,685) 0,115 (0,548)
PEMPL -1,408 (0,728) -0,663 (0,886) -0,107 (1,136) -0,199 (0,688) 0,793 (0,802) -0,201 (0,458) 0,681 (0,798) 0,538 (0,447)
PEMPL*PDAY 0,340 (0,225) -0,031 (0,233) 0,172 (0,245) -0,081 (0,191) 0,355 (0,212) -0,023 (0,202) 0,276 (0,216) -0,023 (0,161)
PEMPL*PHSSEC 0,617 (0,339) 0, 712 (0,367) 0,915 (0,369) 0,287 (0,336) 0,513 (0,284) 0,340 (0,319) 0,596 (0,296) 0,206 (0,276)
PINC 0,008 (0,007) 0,010 (0,008) 0,010 (0,008) 0,005 (0,008) -0,011 (0,007) -0,036 (0,009) 0,002 (0,007) -0,012 (0,007)
DEBT 0,010 (0,002) 0,007 (0,003) 0,004 (0,003) -0,000 (0,002) 0,009 (0,002) 0,011 (0,002) 0,001 (0,002) 0,002 (0,002)
EAST -0,995 (0,302) -0,324 (0,339) -0,077 (0,352) 0,328 (0,301) -0,435 (0,259) 0,060 (0,264) 0,542 (0,288) 0,384 (0,225)
SWEST -0,946 (0,266) -0,447 (0,309) -0,264 (0,327) 0,118 (0,283) -0,736 (0,242) -0,320 (0,253) 0,171 (0,279) 0,113 (0,212)
NORTH -0,817 (0,307) 0,086 (0,332) -0,365 (0,385) 0,388 (0,310) 0,026 (0,259) -0,108 (0,283) 0,642 (0,306) 0,280 (0,240)
Likelihood ratio 2845,58 3963,70
DF 4016 5684
N 1025 1441
'Sub-sample with non-missing information on partner's characteristics. Numbers in bold: Significant at 5% level. Numbers in italics: significant at 10%
level
Table 4. The choice of work and child care. Effects of level and field of
education'. All mothers.
Education
1998 1999
WS WNS WS WNS
Level only2 :
EDUS2 0,962 (0,222) 0,442 (0,184) 0,788 (0,193)  0,308 (0,152 )
EDUU1 1,084 (0,298) 0,304 (0,277) 1,320 (0,261) 0,376 (0,237)
EDUU2 2,097 (0,272 1,083 0,245 1,709 (0,224 0,724 0,192
EDUU3 2,450 (0,472) 1,414 (0,455) 3,566 (0,534) 2,445 (0,516)
Level and field3 :
EDUS2 0,962 (0,222) 0,441 (0,184) 0,786 (0,193) 0,307 (0,152)
EDUU1 1,079 (0,298) 0,304 (0,277) 1,323 (0,261) 0,378 (0,237)
EDUU2T 2,476 (0,390 1,015 (0,384 1,396 0,289) 0,432 (0,256)
EDUU2M 1,602 (0,402) 1,014 (0,359) 1,747 (0,331) 0,815 (0,305)
EDUU2O 2,109 (0,387) 1,204 (0,363) 2,110 (0,332) 1,061 (0,307)
EDUU3 2,447 (0,473) 1,416 (0,456) 3,575 (0,535) 2,454 (0,517)
N 1214 1690
1 The model also include all the remaining covariates in table 2. 2 Estimates as reported in table 2.
3New estimates after including field of education. Numbers in bold: Significant at 5% level. Numbers
in italics: significant at 10% level.
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Table 5. The choice of working hours and child care. Effects of level and field of education. All mothers.
Education
1998 1999
FS FNS PS PNS FS FNS PS PNS
Level only2 :
EDUS2 0,949 (0,266) 0,631 (0,267) 0,673 (0,284) 0,192 (0,199) 0,621 (0,231) 0,207 (0,210) 0,814 (0,252) 0,262 (0,165)
EDUU1 0,988 (0,345) 0,841 (0,352) 0,930 (0,359) -0,263 (0,331) 1,107 (0,298) 0,353 (0,315) 1,304 (0,319) 0,214 (0,257)
EDUU2 1,902 (0,290) 1,002 (0,3 10) 1,063 (0,324) 0,458 (0,246) 1,521 (0,253) 0,733 (0,249) 1,480 (0,276) 0,469 (0,206)
EDUU3 1,970 (0,414) 1,759 (0,429) 0,797 (0,542) -0,661 (0,587) 2,988 (0,469) 2,564 (0,465) 2,590 (0,515) 1,041 (0,500)
Level and field 3 :
EDUS2 0,948 (0,266) 0,629 (0,267) 0,675 (0,284) 0,193 (0,199) 0,621 (0,231) 0,206 (0,210) 0,812 (0,252) 0,262 (0,165)
EDUU1 0,984 (0,345) 0,842 (0,352) 0,930 (0,359) -0,260 (0,331) 1,109 (0,298) 0,356 (0,315) 1,307 (0,319) 0,216 (0,257)
EDUU2T 2,109 (0,365) 0,584 (0,472) 1,181 (0,424) 0,312 (0,358) 1,309 (0,322) 0,585 (0,329) 1,148 (0,358) 0,167 (0,281)
EDUU2M 1,367 (0,444) 0,612 (0,504) 1,203 (0,456) 0,788 (0,352) 1,303 (0,390) 0,602 (0,408) 1,940 (0,370) 0,772 (0,314)
EDUU2O 1,998 (0,373) 1,490 (0,392) 0,721 (0,500) 0,196 (0,388) 1,918 (0,336) 1,029 (0,356) 1,366 (0,408) 0,573 (0,316)
EDUU3 1,966 (0,414) 1,758 (0,429) 0,794 (0,542) -0,656 (0,587) 2,989 (0,469) 2,566 (0,465) 2,593 (0,515) 1,043 (0,500)
N 1214 1690
1 The model also include all the remaining covariates in table 3. 2 Estimates as reported in table 2. 3New estimates after including field of education. Numbers
in bold: Significant at 5% level. Numbers in italics: Significant at 10% level.
Table 6. Estimated probabilities of different combinations of working hours and child care for different educational
groups'. All mothers.
Variable
1998 1999
FS FNS PS PNS NW FS FNS PS PNS NW
Level only:
EDUS1 20,7 12,2 9,9 16,4 40 , 8 13,2 15 , 6 4,5 20,9 45,8
EDUS2 34,2 14,6 12,4 12,7 26 , 1 19,4 15 , 1 8,0 21,4 36,1
EDUU1 34,3 17,4 15,4 7,8 25 , 2 26,5 14 , 8 11,0 17,2 30,5
EDUU2 52,0 12,4 10,7 9,7 15 , 3 31,5 17 , 0 10,3 17,4 23,9
EDUU3 51,2 24,3 7,5 2,9 14 , 1 41,6 32 , 2 9,5 9,4 7,3
Level and field:
EDUS1 20,7 11,8 10,1 16,7 40 , 8 13,1 15,5 4,5 20,9 46,1
EDUS2 34,2 14,1 12,6 12,9 26 , 1 19,2 15,0 8,0 21,4 36,4
EDUU1 34,2 16,9 15,7 7,9 25 , 2 26,4 14,7 11,0 17,2 30,6
EDUU2T 59,2 7,3 11,4 7,9 14 , 2 30,0 17,3 8,8 15,3 28,6
EDUU2M 38,0 10,1 15,7 17,1 19 , 1 24,2 14,2 15,7 22,7 23,2
EDUU2O 53,3 18,2 7,2 7,1 14 , 2 38,2 18,6 7,6 15,9 19,8
EDUU3 51,4 23,7 7,7 3,0 14 , 2 41,4 32,2 9,6 9,5 7,4
N 1214 1690
I The probabilities are computed based on the estimates in table 5, and refer to a mother who is 30 years old, married, lives in the Oslo /Akershus region and
has one child of 24 months.
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